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Summary
This paper analyzes the effect of the 2002 German federal elections to the Lower House of
Parliament (Bundestag) on the financial performance of German energy corporations. We con-
sider the last minute victory of the government coalition consisting of Social Democrats and the
Green party which was generally associated with a major shift in energy policy towards the
promotion of renewable energies and a phasing out of nuclear energy. Our event study ap-
proach is based on the application of the Fama-French three-factor model to estimate abnormal
stock returns. The results of the empirical analysis imply neither for traditional utilities nor for
renewable energy corporations any robust positive or negative impact of the elections and
therefore of the general energy policy direction of the government in the next legislative period.
1 Introduction
The 2002 German federal elections to the Lower House of Parliament (Bundestag) were
excitedly awaited and their results were fully unpredictable. Previous to the ballots, the
acting government consisting of Social Democrats (SPD) and the Green party (Bu¨ndnis
90/Die Gru¨nen) was considered to have about the same chance to win the majority in the
Bundestag as the opposition consisting of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Lib-
eral party (FDP). The so-called “red-green” government coalition finally celebrated a
last minute victory over their “black-yellow” opponents, although at nearly the slightest
possible margin (1.2 percent points of total votes, Gabriel/Vo¨lkl 2003). The election re-
sults were especially important for energy policy: The “red-green” coalition was gener-
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ally associated with a major shift in energy policy towards the promotion of renewable
energies and a phasing out of nuclear energy. In contrast, the “black-yellow” opposition
signaled different priorities especially assigning an important role to nuclear power.
Against this background, we analyze the hypothesis that the governmental energy policy
would have imposed significant costs for German traditional utilities involved in nuclear
energy, so that their profitability was hurt. In contrast, the announced withdrawal of the
nuclear power law by the “black-yellow” opposition could have broadened the activity
fields of traditional utilities. Furthermore, we examine whether German corporations
exclusively engaged in renewable energies would have financially profited from these
election results. The further promotion of renewable energies by the “red-green” coali-
tion comparedwith the “black-yellow” opposition, for example, bymeans of guaranteed
feed-in tariffs which eliminate both price and volume risks for this type of energy (Ag-
nolucci 2005, Mitchell et al. 2006), could be expected to improve the financial perfor-
mance of these corporations.
Methodologically, the micro-econometric analysis of the impacts of general energy pol-
icy on corporate economic performance is rather difficult. Using financial market data,
we apply an event study approach. This aims to measure the effect of a specific event on
the value of a corporation (MacKinley 1997, Kothari/Warner 2006). In this respect,
stock returns can be used as indicators for financial performance by arguing that stock
prices fully reflect all available information on efficient capital markets (Fama 1970) and
thus the discounted expected future cash flows of the respective corporation. Event stu-
dies have been rarely used to examine the impact of energy policy (one exception is Diltz
2002) since this methodology requires that the analyzed event was not anticipated be-
fore. Indeed, many energy regulations are debated in the political arena over a long time,
so that accompanying wealth effects generally are gradually incorporated into the value
of a corporation (Binder 1985). In this respect, event study analyses of elections (Butler/
McNertney 1991, Kahn/Knittel 2003), which are expected to affect energy policy and
whose results are uncertain, seem to be attractive. We specifically apply the three-factor
model of Fama and French (1993) to estimate the abnormal stock returns in our event
study of the 2002 Bundestag elections. In spite of the superiority of this multifactor mod-
el for the explanation of (portfolio) stock returns, event studies mostly use the CAPM
(Capital Asset PricingModel, Sharpe 1964, Lintner 1965) and the market model (Sharpe
1963, Fama 1968) so far.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the conceptual
and theoretical background for our working hypotheses. In Section 3 we present the ap-
plied event study methodology. Section 4 describes the used data and details of our event
study. In Section 5 we discuss the estimation results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
After the 1998 Bundestag elections the German Green party participated in the national
government for the first time in history. The leading party of the corresponding “red-
green” coalition were the Social Democrats. This government coalition was generally
associated with a paradigm shift in energy policy as it was already formulated in the
contract stating the political agenda of the coalition. Two major goals for the legislative
period of the “red-green” coalition were the promotion of renewable energies and a
phasing out of nuclear energy. These goals already formed part of the officially an-
nounced program for the first 100 days of the government (“100-Tage-Programm”).
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Although the “red-green” government coalition failed to implement this energy policy as
quickly, it achieved at least a fundamental change until the end of the legislative period
(Mez 2003). For example, the “Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz” (“EEG”) – a law institu-
tionalizing the promotion of renewable energies – fromMarch 2000 sets technology spe-
cific feed-in tariffs above the prices for generating electricity from fossil fuels (e.g. coal or
gas), while at the same time power distributors were obliged to buy this power, so that
both price and volume risks for this type of energy were eliminated (Agnolucci 2005,
Mitchell et al. 2006). Moreover, negotiations between the government and the power
supply industry (“Energiekonsensgespra¨che”) led in June 2000 to an agreement (“Atom-
konsens”) and in April 2002 to the amendment of a nuclear power law (“Atomgesetz”).
According to this, the operation of existing nuclear power plants was restricted to an
average regular duration of 32 years without financial compensation of the affected uti-
lities and, furthermore, the future construction of new nuclear power plants was legally
dispelled (for a detailed historical overview of German energy regulations including mea-
sures taken by the “red-green” government, see Kern et al. 2004).
Social Democrats and the Green party therefore stood for a new concept of energy policy
regarding a phasing out of nuclear energy and even suggested more pronounced mea-
sures towards the promotion of renewable energies – proposing a doubling of the share
of renewable energies in overall power generation – in their campaigns for the 2002 Bun-
destag elections. In contrast, the opposing Christian Democrats and Liberal party sig-
naled different priorities in energy policy and particularly proclaimed the comeback of
nuclear power. This “black-yellow” opposition argued that a phasing out of nuclear en-
ergy combined with excessive promotion of renewable energies could, on the one hand,
increase electricity prices for households and industry and, on the other hand, make it
expensive to reach long-term German climate policy goals.
According to this, the first working hypothesis for our empirical analysis is that the gov-
ernmental energy policy would have imposed significant costs for German traditional
utilities involved in nuclear energy, so that the victory of the “red-green” coalition in
the 2002 Bundestag elections would have led to negative effects on their corporate fi-
nancial performance, measured by stock returns. Furthermore, the previous discussion
implies that German renewable energy corporations would have financially profited
from the “red-green” support of this type of energy and therefore from the election re-
sults. In other words, our second working hypothesis refers to positive abnormal stock
returns for this group of energy corporations. Due to the corresponding negative incen-
tives for economic activities in the traditional utilities sector and positive incentives for
respective activities in the renewable energies sector, the 2002 Bundestag elections and
the associated energy policy could thus have supported or strengthened – at least in the
long-run – a sub-sectoral shift in German electricity generation.
These hypotheses are based on the assumption that the energy policy of the Social De-
mocrats and the Green party was not anticipated by the capital markets before the fully
unpredictable results of the 2002 Bundestag elections. However, it should be noted that –
as discussed above – the government coalition already formulated its energy policy at the
beginning of its first legislative period in 1998 in the contract stating the political agenda
of the coalition and in the following passed some corresponding laws. Therefore, it was
possible for traditional utilities to adjust their corporate policy in a way to hedge against
all possible election results, for example, by investing in renewable energies and tech-
nologies. In this case, the compliance costs of German phasing out of nuclear energy
could have been rather modest for this group of energy corporations profiting from
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the corresponding feed-in tariffs, which eliminate both price and volume risks for renew-
able energy generation as aforementioned. Another reason which rather suggests the
weakening of any negative abnormal return are the long average remaining times to ma-
turity of the existing nuclear power plants of 32 years. Furthermore, possible compliance
costs could have been entirely borne by the final consumers of electricity also due to their
low price elasticity of demand (Diltz 2002, Kahn/Knittel 2003).
Similarly, it was already possible for renewable energy corporations to react on the “red-
green” energy policy before the 2002 Bundestag elections, for example, in the time per-
iod of the planning and formulation of the “EEG”. This could also have had a moder-
ating effect on any possible (positive) abnormal return. In this respect, it should be men-
tioned that investments of energy corporations generally have a longer time horizon than
only the four years of a (German) legislative period. Finally, it should be noted that both
renewable energy corporations and especially traditional utilities operate abroad, so that
the impact of national energy policy could further be moderated.
As discussed above, the micro-econometric analysis of the effects of several energy reg-
ulations on corporate economic performance is very difficult. As a consequence, it is
especially not possible for us to disentangle the different reasons which could have wea-
kened possible negative or positive abnormal returns. Our event study therefore does not
analyze the financial impacts of specific energy policies, but whether the result of the
2002 Bundestag elections and therefore the general energy policy direction of the
“red-green” coalition compared with their “black-yellow” opponents in the next legis-
lative period had an impact on the financial performance of German energy corpora-
tions.
3 Event study methodology
Using financial market data, event studies examine the stock return behavior for cor-
porations which experience a specific event and therefore aim to measure the effect
on the value of a corporation (MacKinley 1997, Kothari/Warner 2006). One important
assumption of such approaches is that capital markets are sufficiently efficient to react
on events, i.e. on new and surprising information regarding expected future profits of
corporations. Event studies are mostly rested upon the analysis of so-called “normal”
and “abnormal” stock returns which are estimated on the basis of asset pricing models.
The main traditional approaches are the market model (Sharpe 1963, Fama 1968) and
the one-factor model based on the CAPM (Sharpe 1964, Lintner 1965).
However, many studies show that the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993),
which includes – in the same way as the one-factor model – the excess returns Rmt  Rft
for the market portfolio, but also two additional factors, to explain the excess returns
Rit  Rft for a stock (or stock portfolio) i, has more explanatory power than the one-
factor model, for example, Fama and French (1993, 1996) for the U.S., Berkowitz
and Qiu (2001) for the Canadian, Hussain et al. (2002) for the British, and Ziegler
et al. (2007) for the German stock market. The structure of this three-factor model
for a corporation or stock i in period (i.e. day) t is as follows (i ¼ 1; :::;N; t ¼ 1; :::;T):
Rit  Rft ¼ ai þ biðRmt  RftÞ þ siSMBt þ hiHMLt þ eit
In this model Rit andRmt are the returns for corporation i and the market portfolio at the
end of day t and Rft is the risk-free interest rate at the beginning of day t. SMBt is the
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difference between the returns for a portfolio comprising stocks of “small” corporations
and a portfolio comprising stocks of “big” corporations.HMLt is the difference between
the returns for a portfolio comprising stocks of corporations with a “high” book-to-
market equity and a portfolio comprising stocks of corporations with a “low” book-
to-market equity, respectively, in day t (for details see Fama/French 1993). While eit
is the disturbance term with EðeitÞ ¼ 0, the parameters varðeitÞ ¼ r2e ; ai; bi; si, and hi
are unknown and have to be estimated (by OLS). It should be noted that we do not con-
sider two additional bondmarket factors (related to the term spread and default risk) in a
five-factor model as suggested in Fama and French (1993) since they have no additional
explanatory power for the German stock market (Ziegler et al. 2007).
While the unknown normal (excess) returns Kit are defined as the expected (excess) re-
turns without conditioning on the event, the abnormal returns ARit are defined as the
difference between the actual and the normal (excess) returns:
ARit ¼ ðRit  RftÞ  Kit
The unknown parameters in Kit are estimated on the basis of the three-factor model over
all days t in the time interval [T0; :::;T1] (“estimation window”). Based on this, the nor-
mal and abnormal returns are estimated for each corporation i and for separate days t in
the time interval [T1 þ 1; :::;T2] (“event window”). The estimated abnormal returns
est(ARit) are:
estðARitÞ ¼ ðRit  RftÞ  estðaiÞ  estðbiÞðRmt  RftÞ  estðsiÞSMBt  estðhiÞHMLt
If the estimation window is sufficiently large, the est(ARit) are approximately normally
distributed with expectation zero and variance var½estðARitÞ ¼ r2e under the null hy-
pothesis H0 that the event has no impact on the (excess) returns.
The estimated abnormal returns can be aggregated across corporations and over time.
For an aggregation across affected corporations, the estimated average abnormal returns
est(AARt) for a day t in the event window are the means of the estimated abnormal re-
turns for the corporations i ¼ 1; :::;N:
estðAARtÞ ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1
estðARitÞ
For an aggregation over time, the estimated cumulative abnormal returns estðCARiÞ for a
corporation i are the sums of the considered estimated abnormal returns over all days t
from Ta to Tb (with T1 < Ta < Tb < T2 þ 1):
estðCARiÞ ¼
XTb
t¼Ta
estðARitÞ
For a combined aggregation over time and across affected corporations, the estimated
average cumulative abnormal returns est(ACAR) are (besides the alternative calculation
of the sums of the estimated average abnormal returns over time from Ta to Tb) the
means of the estimated cumulative abnormal returns for the corporations i ¼ 1; :::;N:
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estðACARÞ ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1
estðCARiÞ
If the estimated (cumulative) abnormal returns are independent across corporations
and/or over time and if the estimation window is sufficiently large, the estðAARtÞ,
estðCARiÞ, and estðACARÞ are approximately normally distributed with expectation
zero as well as var½estðAARtÞ ¼ r2e=N, var½estðCARiÞ ¼ r2e ðTb  Ta þ 1Þ, and
var½estðACARÞ ¼ ½r2e ðTb  Ta þ 1Þ=N, respectively, under the null hypothesis H0
that the event has no effect.
In our event study we analyze both individual and aggregated abnormal returns. In this
respect, it should be noted that the assumption of estimated (cumulative) abnormal re-
turns being independent across corporations could be violated due to event-time cluster-
ing since we analyze the effect of one singular event. As a consequence, the estimated
variances of the estimated average abnormal returns estðAARtÞ and of the estimated av-
erage cumulative abnormal returns estðACARÞ could be biased downward (Bernard
1987, Kothari/Warner 2006). Furthermore, event-induced variance according to Boeh-
mer et al. (1991) could be a problem for estðAARtÞ. This may result in rejecting the null
hypothesis of no event impact based on estimated average (cumulative) abnormal returns
too often (we will turn to this problem below). In contrast, tests based on estimated ab-
normal returns estðARitÞ and on estimated cumulative abnormal returns estðCARiÞ are
not problematic in this respect.
Based on z-statistics, which directly arise from the approximated normal distributions of
estðARitÞ, estðAARtÞ, estðCARiÞ, and estðACARÞ under H0, we can examine whether the
2002 Bundestag elections actually had an effect on stock returns. We consider several
days after the elections as it is common in many event studies. According to Kothari
and Warner (2006), this analysis permits precise measurements of abnormal stock re-
turns. Based on the assumption that capital markets are sufficiently efficient, they should
react within a very short-term horizon (i.e. within the first day) after the elections since
the new information is immediately available.
4 Data and details of the event study
In our event study we consider two groups of German energy corporations: Traditional
utilities involved in nuclear energy and corporations exclusively engaged in renewable
energies. Regarding the first group, financial data for the calculation of stock returns for
overall N ¼ 5 corporations are available, namely for ENBW, EON, MVV, RWE, and
VATTENFALL. Regarding the second group, corresponding data for overall N ¼ 7 cor-
porations are available, namely for EECH, ENERGIEKONTOR, NORDEX, SOLAR-
PARC, SOLARWORLD, SUNWAYS, and UMWELTKONTOR.
Our financial data stem from a carefully controlled database for German stock corpora-
tions of Richard Stehle from Humboldt University Berlin, Germany (Stehle/Hartmond
1991, Schulz/Stehle 2002). The data contain the (discrete) stock returns Rit and Rmt (in
%) for the aforementioned energy corporations and for the German market portfolio
which comprises all stocks traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange. To calculate the
two risk factors SMBt and HMLt for the estimation of the Fama-French three-factor
model, the data also contain the market and book values of all corporations whose stocks
are traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange, except banks and insurances as well as stock
corporations with negative book values (for details see Ziegler et al. 2007). The risk-free
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interest rates Rft (in %) are based on the corresponding benchmarks for the money and
capital markets in the euro zone.
Our analyzed event date is September 22, 2002, i.e. the date the Bundestag elections took
place. We define the 120 trading days prior to this event as our estimation window
[T0; :::;T1]. Therefore, T0 ¼ T1  119 represents April 5 and T1 represents September
20. This window is used for the estimation of the unknown parameters ai, bi, si, and
hi in the Fama-French three-factor model. Based on the corresponding parameter esti-
mates estðaiÞ, estðbiÞ, estðsiÞ, and estðhiÞ, the abnormal returns are estimated for the
i ¼ 1; :::; 5 traditional utilities and the i ¼ 1; :::;7 renewable energy corporations. It
should be noted that we do not follow the procedure of some other (e.g. environmental)
event studies which incorporate some days before the event into the event window. This
approach is justified if a leakage of information to investors before the information was
fully revealed to the public – at the event day – is possible. For example, Konar and Co-
hen (1997) and Khanna et al. (1998) consider the impact of the public disclosure of cor-
porate emissions on the financial performance of the concerned corporations. By ending
the estimation window ten days before the event and considering the abnormal returns
for some days around the event day, they analyze the possibility that such corporate en-
vironmental information was already available for some investors before the event day.
In contrast, this procedure is obviously inappropriate for our study because a leakage of
information to investors before the event day is impossible since the results of elections
cannot be known prior to the elections. We have nevertheless analyzed the average cu-
mulative abnormal returns over the ten trading days before the 2002 Bundestag elections
(i.e. from September 9 to September 20) to test the robustness of our consideration (natu-
rally on the basis of an appropriate estimation window that ends at September 6). As
expected, and thus in line with our argumentation, these ACAR are neither for the
five traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy nor for the seven corporations exclu-
sively engaged in renewable energies different from zero at any common level of signifi-
cance (these additional estimation results are available upon request).
As a consequence, we specifically consider the 15 trading days after the 2002 Bundestag
elections on September 22 as the event window [T1 þ 1; :::;T2]. While T1 þ 1 thus re-
presents September 23, T2 represents October 11. In this event window all individual
abnormal returns ARit are estimated. In contrast, the average abnormal returns AARt
for the five traditional utilities and for the seven renewable energy corporations, respec-
tively, are only estimated for t ¼ T1 þ 1. Furthermore, we estimate some cumulative ab-
normal returns CARi. While Ta is always T1 þ 1, we consider different time intervals, so
that Tb varies between T1 þ 2, T1 þ 5, and T1 þ 15 and therefore the analyzed length of
time intervals varies between two, five, and 15 days. Additionally, we estimate the av-
erage cumulative abnormal returns ACAR for the three aforementioned time intervals.
5 Estimation results
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the estimation results regarding abnormal returns
for September 23 – the day after the 2002 Bundestag elections – for the five traditional
utilities involved in nuclear energy. Furthermore, the table shows estimation results re-
garding cumulative abnormal returns for the different time intervals as defined above as
well as the estimated average abnormal return for September 23 and respective estimated
average cumulative abnormal returns. Table A1 in the appendix additionally reports for
each of the five traditional utilities the corresponding estimated abnormal returns for
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each of the 15 trading days after the ballots as well as the respective estimated cumulative
abnormal returns.
According to these tables, the average abnormal returns for September 23 and the av-
erage cumulative abnormal returns for the first two, five, and 15 days after the elections
across all corporations do not differ from zero at any common level of significance. In-
stead, even positive estðARitÞ arise for three out of the five traditional utilities for Sep-
tember 23 (so that the identity of the number of positive or negative estimated abnormal
returns cannot be rejected at any common level of significance according to the corre-
sponding sign test) and positive estðCARiÞ even arise for each of the traditional utilities
from September 23 to September 27. However, a significant cumulative abnormal return
for the first two, five, or 15 days after the ballots does not occur for any of the five tradi-
tional utilities. According to these estimation results, there is no evidence for a negative
impact of the 2002 Bundestag elections on stock returns and therefore on the financial
performance of the traditional utilities.
Just like Table 1 for the five traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy, Table 2 re-
ports for the seven corporations exclusively engaged in renewable energies summary sta-
tistics of the estimation results regarding abnormal returns for September 23 and regard-
ing cumulative abnormal returns for the above defined time intervals. Furthermore, the
table shows the estimated average abnormal return for September 23 and the respective
estimated average cumulative abnormal daily returns. Additionally, Table A2 in the ap-
pendix – just like Table A1 for the traditional utilities – reports for each of the seven
renewable energy corporations the respective estimated abnormal returns for each of
the 15 trading days after the elections as well as the corresponding estimated cumulative
abnormal returns.
Table 1 Estimated abnormal returns estðARitÞ, estimated average abnormal returns estðAARtÞ,
estimated cumulative abnormal returns estðCARiÞ, and estimated average cumulative abnormal
returns est(ACAR) for the five traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy
Day
Number of negative estðARitÞ
(number of ARit which differ from zero
at the 5% level of significance)
estðAARtÞ
(z-statistic)
September 23 2 0.29
(0) (0.46)
Time intervals
Number of negative estðCARiÞ
(number of CARi which differ from zero
at the 5% level of significance)
estðACARÞ
(z-statistics)
September 23 – September 24 3 0.67
(2 trading days after the event) (0) (0.74)
September 23 – September 27 0 1.74
(5 trading days after the event) (0) (1.22)
September 23 – October 11 2 0.07
(15 trading days after the event) (0) (0.03)
Note: * (**, ***) means that the null hypothesis that the average abnormal returns AARt or the average cumulative
abnormal returns ACAR are zero can be rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the
corresponding two-tailed z-test)
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According to these tables, positive estðARitÞ for September 23 arise for six out of the
seven renewable energy corporations and the average abnormal return for September
23 differs from zero at the 1% level of significance. Furthermore, a significant average
cumulative abnormal return from September 23 to September 24 occurs. However, a
short-term overreaction of the stock markets is possible since the average cumulative
abnormal returns for the first five and 15 days after the elections do not differ from
zero at any common level of significance. It should also be noted that the clearly positive
estðAARtÞ for September 23 and the positive estðACARÞ from September 23 to Septem-
ber 24 are strongly affected by the estðARitÞ and estðCARiÞ for only one corporation,
namely SUNWAYS, which suggests a firm-specific effect rather than a general impact
on the entire sector. Furthermore, the hypotheses of an identical number of positive
and negative estimates estðARitÞ for September 23 as well as of an equal number of po-
sitive and negative estimates estðCARtÞ from September 23 to September 24 cannot even
be rejected at the 10% level of significance according to the corresponding sign tests.
Finally, these estimation results should indeed be treated with caution: On the one hand,
the volatility of the corresponding stock returns is extremely high. On the other hand,
these renewable energy corporations are generally characterized by low trades which
could lead to errors-in-variables problems.
As discussed above, it could be argued that the assumption of independent estimated
abnormal returns across corporations is violated in our study due to event-time cluster-
ing with one common event date for all corporations. Furthermore, event-induced var-
iance according to Boehmer et al. (1991) could be a problem. As a consequence, the null
hypothesis of no event impact based on estimated average (cumulative) abnormal returns
may be rejected too often. However, it should be noted that the main result for both
renewable energy corporations and traditional utilities is that this null hypothesis is
Table 2 Estimated abnormal returns estðARitÞ, estimated average abnormal returns estðAARtÞ,
estimated cumulative abnormal returns estðCARiÞ, and estimated average cumulative abnormal
returns est(ACAR) for the seven corporations exclusively engaged in renewable energies
Day
Number of positive estðARitÞ
(number of ARit which differ from zero
at the 5% level of significance)
estðAARtÞ
(z-statistic)
September 23 6 5.72***
(1) (3.18)
Time intervals
Number of positive estðCARiÞ
(number of CARi which differ from zero
at the 5% level of significance)
estðACARÞ
(z-statistics)
September 23 – September 24 6 5.58**
(2 trading days after the event) (1) (2.19)
September 23 – September 27 4 2.66
(5 trading days after the event) (0) (0.66)
September 23 – October 11 2 3.93
(15 trading days after the event) (0) (0.56)
Note: * (**, ***) means that the null hypothesis that the average abnormal returns AARt or the average cumulative
abnormal returns ACAR are zero can be rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the
corresponding two-tailed z-test)
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not rejected at common levels of significance in most cases. Therefore, we abstain from
additional robustness checks regarding event-time clustering which do not require the
assumption of the independence of estimated abnormal returns across corporations (in
this respect, MacKinley 1997, also suggests – besides the analysis of abnormal returns
that are not averaged across corporations – the examination of aggregated portfolio re-
turns instead of single stock returns). In contrast, we have applied the alternative test
statistic of Boehmer et al. (1991) – addressing event-induced variance – to check the
robustness of our results regarding the average abnormal returns for September 23. In-
deed, the corresponding test results are qualitatively fully identical with those according
to Table 1 and Table 2 since the estimated test statistics are 0.62 for the five traditional
utilities and 2.62 for the seven renewable energy corporations. Therefore, both tests im-
ply that the average abnormal return does not differ from zero at any common level of
significance for the traditional utilities, but differs from zero at the 1% level of signifi-
cance for the renewable energy corporations.
6 Conclusions
This paper examines the effect of the last minute victory of the acting government con-
sisting of Social Democrats and the Green party in the 2002 German federal elections to
the Lower House of Parliament (Bundestag) on stock returns for German energy cor-
porations. The main result of our empirical analysis is that there is no evidence that
the election results in favor of the “red-green” government coalition compared with their
“black-yellow” opponents had any financial impact. Our event study indicates neither
for traditional utilities nor for renewable energy corporations any robust positive or ne-
gative abnormal return subsequently to the elections. Methodologically, we apply the
three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) to estimate the abnormal stock returns.
Whereas this multifactor model has obviously more explanatory power for stock returns
than the one-factor model based on the CAPM and the market model, event studies
mostly use such limited one-factor models so far. To test the robustness of our estimation
results, we have nevertheless also applied the traditional one-factor model. The corre-
sponding estimation results (which are available upon request) imply only slight differ-
ences to the estimation results as discussed above, so that the main conclusions hold if
this simple asset pricing model is applied.
As a consequence, none of our two working hypotheses can be confirmed by our em-
pirical analysis. In other words, neither the hypothesis that the “red-green” energy policy
would have imposed significant costs for German traditional utilities involved in nuclear
energy, nor the hypothesis that German corporations exclusively engaged in renewable
energies would have financially profited from the “red-green” support of this type of
energy and therefore from the 2002 Bundestag election results, can be supported. As
discussed above, it is not possible to disentangle different possible factors for this result.
Therefore, it can only be speculated whether the energy policy of the “red-green” gov-
ernment coalition was already anticipated by the capital markets before the 2002 Bun-
destag elections, for example, since traditional utilities invested in renewable energies
and technologies, or whether the international orientation of energy corporations gen-
erally weakens any economic effect of national regulations.
In any case, it should be noted that the German oligopolistic energy market has been (and
is) generally highly regulated and that the politically connected energy corporations may
have had (and have) a high influence on legislative procedures. This influence has at least
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been suggested by recent analyses on the political economy of German environmental
and energy policy (see Anger et al. 2006, for the introduction of the ecological tax re-
form, or Anger et al., 2008, for the allowance allocation in the EU Emission Trading
Scheme). Against this background, the different priorities in energy policy between
the “red-green” government and the “black-yellow” opponents in their campaigns
for the 2002 Bundestag elections could be considered minor within this general market
structure. As a consequence, it could be argued that the economic performance of energy
corporations would have been only marginally affected by the different governments, so
that no robust effect of the election results on stock returns can be shown.
Appendix
Table A1 Estimated abnormal returns estðARitÞ and estimated cumulative abnormal returns
estðCARiÞ for each of the five traditional utilities involved in nuclear energy
ENBW EON MVV RWE VATTENFALL
Day Estimated abnormal returns estðARitÞ
(z-statistics)
September 23 0.30 1.08 1.98 0.23 0.50
(0.37) (0.72) (1.38) (0.15) (0.29)
September 24 0.26 1.16 0.34 1.95 1.61
(0.33) (0.77) (0.24) (1.31) (0.94)
September 25 1.32* 2.38 0.25 1.45 0.92
(1.66) (1.59) (0.17) (0.98) (0.54)
September 26 1.50* 6.50*** 0.59 5.29*** 1.36
(1.89) (4.33) (0.41) (3.55) (0.79)
September 27 0.27 2.36 1.09 4.14*** 2.52
(0.33) (1.58) (0.76) (2.79) (1.47)
September 30 0.18 4.10*** 0.29 2.53* 0.32
(0.23) (2.73) (0.20) (1.70) (0.18)
October 01 0.06 2.62* 1.16 0.83 0.78
(0.07) (1.75) (0.81) (0.56) (0.46)
October 02 0.03 2.91* 0.96 5.31*** 0.12
(0.04) (1.94) (0.67) (3.57) (0.07)
October 03 0.27 0.02 0.08 1.27 2.70
(0.34) (0.01) (0.06) (0.85) (1.57)
October 04 0.15 2.76* 1.26 1.34 0.34
(0.19) (1.84) (0.87) (0.90) (0.20)
October 07 0.28 0.14 1.14 0.45 1.93
(0.36) (0.09) (0.79) (0.30) (1.12)
October 08 0.01 2.50* 0.29 3.81** 1.12
(0.01) (1.67) (0.20) (2.56) (0.65)
October 09 0.16 5.81*** 2.76* 3.21** 0.68
(0.20) (3.87) (1.92) (2.16) (0.39)
October 10 0.12 4.78*** 1.14 3.71** 0.25
(0.15) (3.18) (0.79) (2.50) (0.14)
October 11 0.40 2.64* 1.45 3.97*** 0.58
(0.51) (1.76) (1.01) (2.67) (0.34)
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Table A1 (cont.)
ENBW EON MVV RWE VATTENFALL
Time intervals Estimated cumulative abnormal returns estðCARiÞ
(z-statistics)
September 23 –
September 24
0.56 2.24 1.64 2.17 1.11
(0.49) (1.05) (0.81) (1.03) (0.46)
September 23 –
September 27
0.64 4.28 2.39 0.42 0.97
(0.36) (1.28) (0.74) (0.13) (0.25)
September 23 –
October 11
1.14 0.27 0.27 1.81 0.21
(0.37) (0.05) (0.05) (0.31) (0.03)
Note: * (**, ***) means that the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns ARit or the cumulative abnormal returns
CARi are zero can be rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the corresponding two-
tailed z-test)
Table A2 Estimated abnormal returns estðARitÞ and estimated cumulative abnormal returns
estðCARiÞ for each of the seven corporations exclusively engaged in renewable energies
EECH ENERGIE-
KONTOR
NORDEX SOLAR-
PARC
SOLAR-
WORLD
SUN-
WAYS
UMWELT-
KONTOR
Day Estimated abnormal returns estðARitÞ
(z-statistics)
September 23 4.40 8.73* 4.11 1.00 8.27* 14.09*** 8.26
(0.82) (1.91) (1.05) (0.24) (1.79) (2.62) (1.58)
September 24 9.76* 6.66 4.31 4.39 5.41 2.65 1.44
(1.83) (1.46) (1.10) (1.07) (1.17) (0.49) (0.27)
September 25 11.16** 3.80 4.92 0.24 3.84 3.10 2.30
(2.09) (0.83) (1.26) (0.06) (0.83) (0.58) (0.44)
September 26 3.49 7.49 1.08 0.74 0.62 0.41 3.36
(0.65) (1.64) (0.28) (0.18) (0.13) (0.08) (0.64)
September 27 9.32* 9.07** 0.95 0.81 9.09** 2.73 6.41
(1.75) (1.99) (0.24) (0.20) (1.97) (0.51) (1.22)
September 30 2.87 7.50 0.37 0.63 10.11** 9.47* 3.31
(0.54) (1.64) (0.10) (0.15) (2.19) (1.76) (0.63)
October 01 33.82*** 3.48 11.49*** 0.52 2.13 1.83 13.16**
(6.34) (0.76) (2.94) (0.13) (0.46) (0.34) (2.51)
October 02 17.24*** 0.32 4.18 0.75 1.33 7.71 6.42
(3.23) (0.07) (1.07) (0.18) (0.29) (1.43) (1.23)
October 03 3.10 8.45* 0.29 2.50 1.13 2.97 5.96
(0.58) (1.85) (0.07) (0.61) (0.25) (0.55) (1.14)
October 04 31.33*** 1.63 1.69 0.64 4.99 8.38 1.47
(5.87) (0.36) (0.43) (0.16) (1.08) (1.56) (0.28)
October 07 7.21 7.51* 3.30 0.77 6.43 5.42 0.71
(1.35) (1.65) (0.84) (0.19) (1.39) (1.01) (0.14)
October 08 4.81 0.80 1.69 0.42 7.77* 5.17 9.27*
(0.90) (0.17) (0.43) (0.10) (1.68) (0.96) (1.77)
October 09 14.26*** 2.71 4.61 0.76 1.36 1.53 4.91
(2.67) (0.59) (1.18) (0.19) (0.29) (0.28) (0.94)
October 10 7.92 4.18 10.95*** 0.54 6.19 6.76 0.30
(1.48) (0.91) (2.80) (0.13) (1.34) (1.26) (0.06)
October 11 4.69 4.68 6.09 7.01* 10.24** 4.33 2.55
(0.88) (1.03) (1.56) (1.71) (2.22) (0.81) (0.49)
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Table A2 (cont.)
EECH ENERGIE-
KONTOR
NORDEX SOLAR-
PARC
SOLAR-
WORLD
SUN-
WAYS
UMWELT-
KONTOR
Time intervals Estimated cumulative abnormal returns estðCARiÞ
(z-statistics)
September 23 – 5.36 2.07 0.20 5.39 2.86 16.74** 6.82
September 24 (0.71) (0.32) (0.04) (0.93) (0.44) (2.20) (0.92)
September 23 – 11.63 10.69 3.09 7.18 8.73 15.96 12.17
September 27 (0.97) (1.05) (0.35) (0.78) (0.85) (1.33) (1.04)
September 23 – 30.35 5.04 4.65 20.19 5.32 4.24 8.71
October 11 (1.47) (0.29) (0.31) (1.27) (0.30) (0.20) (0.43)
Note: * (**, ***) means that the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns ARit or the cumulative abnormal returns
CARi are zero can be rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the corresponding two-
tailed z-test)
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